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ABSTRACT: Pro-Foreign Domestic Investment (FDI) policies have become a pillar 
of the development convention. While the literature has provided numerous studies 
on the effects of FDI on growth and investment in host country, very little is known 
about how domestic investment itself affects FDI inflows. The paper is an attempt to 
fill this gap. Evidences from a large cross-country sample (68 countries), over a long 
period (1984-2004), show that lagged domestic investment has a strong influence on 
FDI inflows in the host economy, implying that domestic investment is a strong ca-
talyst for FDI in developing countries and that multinational companies do follow 
economic development.
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UMA CRÍTICA EMPÍRICA DA CONVENÇÃO DO “DESEN-
VOLVIMENTO DO INVESTIMENTO DIRETO EXTERNO (IDE)”
RESUMO: As políticas pró-IDE tornaram-se um pilar da convenção do desenvolvi-
mento. Embora na literatura especializada inúmeros estudos abordem os efeitos do IDE 
sobre o crescimento e o investimento no país recebedor do IDE, pouco se sabe sobre 
como o investimento doméstico afeta os fluxos do IDE. Este trabalho tem o objetivo de 
preencher essa lacuna. Dados de uma ampla amostra de 68 países no período de 1984 
a 2004 mostram que o investimento doméstico defasado exerce uma forte influência 
sobre os fluxos de IDE no país de destino, sugerindo que o investimento doméstico é 
um forte catalisador do IDE nos países em desenvolvimento e que as empresas multi-
nacionais seguem o desenvolvimento econômico. Isso sugere que os instrumentos de 
política industrial, notadamente políticas de promoção do investimento direcionadas 
para firmas nacionais, também serão suficientes para atrair investidores estrangeiros.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Investimento direto externo; países em desenvolvimento; inves-
timento doméstico; política industrial.
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1. FDI’S STATUS IN THE DEVELOPMENT CONVENTION
While Aid and concessional loans used to account for the bulk of resource flows to 
developing countries (DC) a couple of decades ago, FDI has become the main source 
of external resource. Table 1 below shows that the resource flows to DC have increa-
sed since the early 1990s and that the most dramatic net increases have been in private 
capital flows, particularly FDI. The share of FDI in total net flows grew from 29% in 
1991 to 80 % in 2008; meanwhile the share of official flows declined from 50 % to 3%. 
In nominal and real terms, official flows are now significantly lower than during the 
previous decades.
Table 1 - How important is FDI as a source of foreign capital in developing countries? 
(in billion USD)
Bio USD 1970 1991 2000 2008 
(A) Official net flows(grants + concessional loans) 5.4 62.2 35.3 20
(B) Private net flows (portolio invt + FDI) 5.8 62 225.8 707
(A) + (B) = Net resource flows 11.2 124.2 261.1 727
 FDI / net resource flows (in ratio) 0.20 0.29 0.64 0.80
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on Kokko (2002), Global Development Finance (2009, 2002), World Bank.
With few alternatives sources of foreign financing, it is not surprising that the atti-
tudes towards inward FDI have changed over the last couple of decades. In contrast to 
former scepticism about whether FDI inflows should be encouraged at all, and to the 
frequent implementation of unfriendly policies towards Multinational Corporations 
(MNC), policy makers, as well as many scholars, now take the beneficial effects of FDI 
for granted. “MNC used to be seen as the emblem of dependency; they have now be-
come the saviours of development” (Rodrik, 1999). 
Pro-FDI policies rapidly became a pillar of the Washington consensus growth nar-
rative, a pillar of the “neoliberal development convention” (Erber, 2008). “Development 
convention are ‘stories’ told about changes, (...) of how the future will be much better 
than the present if we follow the prescribed rules” (Erber, 2009). In that story, inter-
national capital mobility would allow global savings to be better allocated, to channel 
resources to investment projects in DC and to raise income and growth. According to 
the IMF Head, Stanley Fisher, “it was an inevitable step on the path of development 
which cannot be avoided” for DC governments1.
This policy convention has spread into the academic field and into institutions such 
as laws and regulations. 
Its spreading has been supported by a body of literature, which insists on the posi-
tive role of FDI in the growth and development processes (Borensztein et al., 1998; De 
1 In “Capital Account Liberalization and the role of the IMF”, IMF Seminar on Asia Hong Kong, Sept 19, 
1997. Quoted in Rodrik (2011). See also in Rodrik (2011, chapter 4).
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Melo, 1999; Markusen et al., 1999; OECD, 2002; Rodrik, 2000, 1999). Thus, in addition 
to fill the traditional investment and foreign exchange gaps, FDI can stimulate domestic 
investment, increase local market competition, enlarge international market access for 
local products, and generate externalities and knowledge “spillovers” (Blomstrom and 
Kokko, 2000). While development strategies used to focus on State’s investments and 
interventions, FDI is now considered as the main source of catching-up and technolo-
gical development. “The policy objective regarding investment is to improve the returns 
to investment in poor countries, both domestic and foreign, with a particular goal to 
increase the FDI flows directed to poor countries”, considers an updated OECD paper 
on FDI in DC (Mayer, 2006). FDI attraction has become a development agendas priority. 
Almost all countries liberalized their FDI policies. Those FDI policy changes have 
become more widespread since 1989, and the Eastern European economies “transition” 
process. According to UNCTAD (2001), more than 95% of the 1185 FDI regulation 
changes implemented during the 1990s have significantly eased restrictions on FDI in-
flows and MNC operations. In fact, despite (or thanks to) the absence of a multilateral 
framework for FDI, “unilateral, bilateral and regional efforts towards the liberalisation 
of national FDI frameworks have led to a remarkable level of de facto convergence of 
government policy approaches towards FDI among countries from all regions” (UNC-
TAD, 1994, p. 286).
Thus, DC governments have turned to the question of how to attract FDI and have 
initiated various measures to achieve this goal. The design and the implementation of 
FDI promotion policies have been promoted, and often supported, by international 
organisations and foreign donors (from the IMF to the EC) to help DC to benefit from 
this potent force for economic growth2. Thus, every host government now provides 
numerous forms of incentives to encourage entry by MNC: fiscal privileges, regula-
tion distortions or exemptions, subsidies, preferential loans and guarantees. Foreign 
investment promotion agencies and attractiveness policies have flourished everywhere 
to build up or strengthen host country location advantages (Blomstrom and Kokko,  
2003; Oman, 2000).
DC has implemented policies aimed at creating stronger incentives for foreign in-
vestors who are potentially capable of providing FDI flows. Understanding the deter-
minants of FDI inflows and unveiling the reasons why some developing countries are 
more successful than others in attracting FDI may thus provide policy makers with 
useful guidance for future policies. FDI flows can undoubtedly promote growth. Ho-
wever, the reverse causality, from growth to international investment attraction, may 
2 See for instance the Initiative on Governance and Investment for Development in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) initiated by the OECD (www.oecd.org/mena), or a similar project promoted by the 
EC (http://www.animaweb.org).
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explain most of the correlation. MNC location decisions should be influenced by host 
countries economic performance: it would be logical for MNCs to choose to invest in 
more profitable economies. Thus, this paper primary focus is to investigate whether 
domestic investment is a significant determinant of FDI in developing countries. It di-
ffers from existing studies because, firstly, it uses a large cross-country (68 developing 
countries) sample over a long period (1984-2004) and, secondly, because it analyzes the 
influence of domestic performance on international integration, rather than the impact 
of international integration on domestic performance.
The next section offers a review of the literature on the determinants of FDI in de-
veloping countries. Section 3 provides an introduction to our analytical framework. 
Methodology and data used in the empirical study are presented in Section 4. Section 
5 discusses the regression results, and Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2. HOW ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN FDI LOCATION 
The increasing role played by FDI in developing countries has created considerable re-
search interest among economists. Consequently, an extensive empirical literature exists 
on  FDI determinants in developing countries and/or on MNCs location determinants. 
The literature examines a large number of variables that have been put forward to explain 
FDI. Some of these variables are encompassed in formal hypotheses, whereas others are 
only suggested because they make sense intuitively. In the absence of a consensus on a 
theoretical framework to guide the empirical work, the result is a sizeable and diverse 
literature in which investigators have considered a number of explanatory variables in 
an attempt to establish a statistically significant relationship among FDI inflows and 
other variables of interest. Those studies have identified a number of variables, such as 
market size, economic openness, rate of return, quality of infrastructure, human capital, 
political instability, as potential determinants of FDI (Lim, 2001). However, according 
to Chakrabati meticulous surveys (2003, 2001), while “a vast empirical literature not 
only exists but continue to grow around the issues of identifying the forces attracting 
FDI. It is not exactly clear whether one can have any confidence in the conclusions re-
ached by FDI regressions”. 
Empirical studies on FDI determinants mainly come in two forms: investor sur-
veys and econometric or case studies. For example, the large survey of 1000 firms by 
A.T. Kearney mentions large market size, political and macroeconomic stability, GDP 
growth, domestic regulations and the ability to repatriate profits as the most important 
factors affecting FDI location (Development Business, 1999). A World Bank survey on 
investment location preference in East Asia of 173 Japanese manufacturing firms also 
ranks the size of the market, plus the cost of labor and FDI policies as the main deter-
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minants (Kawaguchi, 1994). A study on the consequence of EU enlargement on FDI 
flows towards other developing or emerging countries finds similar results: host market 
size and growth rate have the highest influence (Kawaguchi, 1994). It is noteworthy that 
fiscal and tax incentives were considered as having little or no impact on FDI location 
decisions. Buch et al. (2005) investigate the determinants of German FDI location over 
the world. They show that a 1% increase in the size of a given foreign market is associa-
ted with a 1% increase in the activity of the German firms in this location. 
Econometric studies typically use aggregate measures of FDI to study either one 
particular country or a panel of countries. While a couple of variables such as market 
size or labor cost are usually included in empirical models, other determinants chosen 
vary significantly, according to data availability or research objective. On average, the 
most robust determinant of FDI inflows is the market size. Market size estimated by 
real GDP or GDP per capita is significant in most studies (Dupuch and Mazier, 2002; 
Mayer, 2006; Michalet, 1999; Levasseur, 2002; Lim, 2001) – a result that may reflect 
the predominance of market seeking FDI strategies (“horizontal” FDI). The stock of 
infrastructure in the host country also has a positive impact on FDI inflows (Dupuch 
and Mazier, 2002; Kinda, 2007; Kumar, 2000; Rieber, 2000). Agglomeration effects are 
often found to be highly significant (Lim, 2001). Sectoral studies show that MNCs lo-
cation choices are strongly influenced by the presence of foreign investors. The impact 
of trade openness is expected to be uncertain, because of the prevailing horizontal na-
ture of FDI strategies. Nevertheless, several studies show a positive link (Lecraw, 1991; 
OECD, 2002). Low labor cost should have a positive influence on FDI. However, the 
impact becomes mitigated or null when the different qualities of labor are included 
in the model. For example, Mody et al. (1998) do not find that low wages are a deter-
minant of Japanese FDI, although a better quality of labor influences positively FDI. 
Similarly, higher tax levels are expected to negatively influence MNC location choices 
and FDI inflows. However, this negative causality is not robust. In fact, most of the cost 
variables, as wage and tax for instance, can be integrated in econometric regression as 
proxies of host country advantages in terms of labor productivity or infrastructure and 
public goods supply. Then, the empirical results are mixed. The country economic and 
social stability does influence very significantly FDI inflows, and MNC avoid countries 
and territories where political risks and economic instability are high (Asiedu, 2001; 
Lecraw, 1991; Pigato, 2001). 
While a large number of studies have been conducted to identify the determinants 
of FDI attraction, a real consensus has yet to emerge. There is no robust set of expla-
natory variables that can be regarded as the core or the “true” determinants of FDI. 
Results in the literature are very sensitive to sample selection and methodology, indi-
cating a lack of robustness (Moosa and Cardak, 2005). Chakrabarti (2001) concludes 
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that “the relation between FDI and many of the controversial variables (namely, tax, 
wages, openness, exchange rate, tariffs, growth and trade balance) are highly sensitive 
to small alterations in the conditioning information set”. The two main exceptions are 
market size, a robust and positive determinant of FDI, and country instability, a ro-
bust but negative explaining factor. Agglomeration effects additionally have a positive 
influence. However, since they explain current FDI flows by the amount of cumulated 
FDI in the country, they leave open the determinants of the initial investments and this 
result can not lead to practical policy implications. 
To sum up, the empirical evidences on FDI attraction drive us back to the basic 
structure of the investment behaviour since Keynes: the investment decision (the lo-
cation choice or investment attraction) results from the combination of the volume of 
demand (proxies here are market size variables) with the risk of investment (proxies 
here: instability or country risk indicator).
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1. FIRMS INVESTMENT BEHAVIOURS
However global, FDI does not flow everywhere with the same intensity. Among deve-
loping countries, certain host economies are more attractive than others. While there 
is no consensus on the determinants of host country FDI attractiveness, differences in 
international attractiveness between countries are easy to observe. 
The only unambiguous conclusion from empirical studies is that MNC location choi-
ce follows the basic investment selection process: the decision to invest is based on the 
combination of two determinants, demand size and risk assessment. Thus we can expect 
MNC to follow local firms’ behaviour, because the latter are closer to the demand and 
they are usually the first to be informed of changes in the domestic market opportunities. 
It is extremely difficult to point out to a single FDI locational determinant. Inste-
ad, MNC are attracted toward countries that offer adequate combinations of locatio-
nal determinants such as conditions for stable operations and access to large markets 
(Dunning, 1998; Muchielli, 1998; Noorbash, 2001; Siebert, 1999). In such countries, 
the domestic investment level is high, because there are many business opportunities. 
This level reflects the degree of economic attractiveness of the country, i.e.: the location-
-specific combination of business opportunities and risks on which the private domestic 
investment level in the country is based. For the same reason, FDI attraction will re-
sult from the country level of economic attractiveness, because foreign firms target the 
same type of profitable environment, as do local entrepreneurs. If not, it would imply 
that MNC typically do invest where local firms cannot identify profitable investment 
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opportunities (i.e., low level of economic attractiveness), or that MNC usually do not 
invest where they are plenty of such opportunities (i.e., high level of economic attrac-
tiveness), as shown by the investment rate of domestic firms3, or both.
Thus, we expect domestic investment to lead foreign direct investment. Private 
investment by developing countries firms signals profitable opportunities and stable 
conditions, and thus stimulates FDI. In other words, domestic investment acts as a ca-
talyst for foreign investment.
3.2. WHY WOULD FDI FOLLOW DOMESTIC INVESTMENT? EMPIRICAL STUDIES
A large attention has been devoted in the literature to FDI impact on economic growth 
in host countries, and a number of studies have examined the impact of FDI on do-
mestic investment. In the neoclassical growth model, FDI promotes economic growth 
by increasing the volume of investment and/or its efficiency (Li and Liu, 2005). Thus, 
FDI positive contribution mainly comes from growth stimulation (Borensztein et al., 
1998; De Mello, 1999; Findlay, 1978; Lim, 2001; Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2003; Wang, 
1990) and from FDI’s role as a channel for technology transfer and spillovers, notably 
through linkages with local suppliers (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2000; Grether, 1997; 
Smarzynska, 2004; Xu and Wang, 2000). Several papers have also attempted to measure 
the crowding-in and crowding-out effects of FDI on domestic investment (Agosin and 
Machado, 2005; Agosin and Mayer, 2000; Bosworth and Collins, 1999; Kumar and Pra-
dhan, 2002; Markusen and Venables, 1999), with conflicting results. In comparison, a 
very narrow attention has been dedicated to the impact of domestic investment on FDI.
To our knowledge, only three papers explicitly include domestic investment as a 
potential determinant of FDI. Harrison and Revenga (1995) include domestic invest-
ment as an explanatory variable in a research on trade policy liberalisation impact. They 
find that compared with the size of the local market and openness to trade, domestic 
investment has no impact on FDI. This result is probably due to the heterogeneity of 
the sample, notably in terms of openness to FDI, during a period (1970-1992) when 
developing countries FDI policies were quite diverse. To the authors: the 1999 paper by 
McMillan should be cited here and included in the list of references. This conclusion, 
and apparent paradox – when local firms choose to invest more, foreign companies 
choose to invest less – result directly from the method chosen to measure domestic in-
vestment: domestic investment = Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) minus FDI. But 
FDI is a balance of payment data, not a National Account one. FDI does not translate 
3 Such discordance may appear because of a very particular context, as in the case of off-shore investments 
for instance.
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nor immediately neither systematically into real capital formation in the host country. 
For instance, the acquisition of a local company by a foreign investor is a transfer of 
assets. It will result in a capital inflow, noticed in the balance of payment, but it will not 
increase capital formation in the country. Moreover, FDI flows are much more unstable 
than GFCF. As a result, FDI variation will largely determine the change of the proxy used 
to measure domestic investment [-FDI + GFCF], and the relationship between those 
two variables will always be negative. In a very creative paper on Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Ndikumana and Verick (2008) investigate whether domestic investment promotes FDI 
and is in its turn affected by FDI. Their study cover 38 African countries from 1970 to 
2005, and they separate private domestic investment and public domestic investment, 
thanks to a World Bank database on Africa. Their conclusion goes in the opposite di-
rection. Their results indicate that the relationship between FDI and domestic invest-
ment run both way. But the positive impact of domestic investment on FDI, especially 
in the case of private investment, is stronger and more robust that the reverse relation. 
Public domestic investment also has a positive influence on FDI inflows.
3.3. WHY WOULD FDI FOLLOW DOMESTIC INVESTMENT? THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
In theory, there appear to be several ways in which domestic investment might influence 
positively FDI. Two obvious channels are, firstly, agglomeration economies and pola-
risation effects and, secondly, information asymmetry. The theory of MNC’s specific 
advantage offers an additional explanation.
Agglomeration effects and interfirm externalities create linkages between domestic 
and foreign investors. Several studies based on an economic geography or an endogenous 
growth framework show that the stock of public infrastructure is a positive determinant 
of FDI inflows (Kinda, 2007). In an endogenous growth model, public capital stock 
increases production factors productivity and reduces transaction costs (Barro, 1990; 
Rieber, 1999). Infrastructure increases the return on investment and stimulates private 
investment. For example, Loree and Guisinger (1995) show that countries with more 
developed infrastructures receive a higher share of US FDI. Kumar (2001) obtains the 
same positive relationship in a study based on a 66 countries sample, as well as Asiedu 
(2001) in her research on FDI determinants in African countries. Thus, the better the 
state of the host country infrastructure is, the more profitable the FDI is. Therefore, 
ceteris paribus, FDI follows increases in public domestic investment. In other words, 
public investment leads FDI.
Another major result of the literature on MNC’s investment is their tendency to 
agglomerate in certain country in a higher proportion than what would be expected 
from the size of the market (Fontagné and Meyer, 2005). Agglomeration or clustering 
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effects are found to be highly significant. As a consequence, the existing stock of FDI 
has a very positive influence on new foreign investments, notably in developing coun-
tries (Alaya et al., 2007; Hanson, 2001; Yehoue, 2005). Foreign investors may be in-
fluenced by the presence of other foreign firms for various reasons, including the gain 
from inter-firms externalities and the signal of profitability given by the success of the 
first firms (Lim, 2001).
The positive attributes of previous public investment and foreign investment should 
also be important in the case of private domestic investments. An increase on domestic 
private investments, as a stock or as a flow, contributes to reduce transaction costs, as 
well as increasing technology spreading or extending interfirm division of labor. Most 
of the externalities and agglomeration effects produced by public or foreign investment 
can be generated by the domestic private sector as well. As a consequence, the deter-
minants that explain the positive influence of public investment or foreign investment 
stock on FDI inflows are also relevant in the case of private domestic investment. Pri-
vate investment should also lead FDI. 
Therefore, we will use GFCF as a proxy, to estimate the influence of domestic in-
vestment on FDI inflows. GFCF include public and private domestic investment4. These 
two types of investment increase the rate of return of new investment, and both can be 
expected to have a positive influence on FDI. 
A second type of linkage between domestic investment and FDI can be found in 
the concept of the firm’s specific advantage, on which is based the modern theory of 
the multinational company and international investment. Initially proposed by Hymer 
(1976) and later taken up and developed further, notably by Dunning (1988, 1977) in 
his “eclectic paradigm”, the firm‘s specific advantages are linked to market imperfec-
tions and give the firm a competitive advantage over its rivals. The specific advantage 
is a determinant of large companies’ investments abroad, because they give them the 
power to be competitive on foreign markets, despite the domestic firms’ advantages 
in terms of market knowledge, local linkages (Ietto Gillis, 2005; Muchielli, 1998). The 
ownership of such competitive assets (brand, scale, technology) is necessary for the 
FDI project to succeed. This analytical framework implicitly assumes that FDI follow 
domestic investments, because domestic investors have more accurate information 
about the local business climate than do foreign investors. As Graham and Krugman 
(1991) put it: “domestic firms have better knowledge and access to domestic markets; 
if a foreign firm decides to enter the market, it must compensate for the advantages 
enjoyed by domestic firms” (in Borenszstein et al., 1998). Thus, the coherent sequence 
4 GFCF includes private investment. In a market economy, it can be used as a proxy for private investment, 
when such data is not available.
REC_16.3_art.750.indd   401 21/01/2013   16:52:57
402 Rev. Econ. Contemp., Rio de Janeiro, v. 16, n. 3, p. 393-414, set-dez/2012
with the specific advantage concept is when domestic investment leads foreign direct 
investment. The contrary (FDI before domestic investment), as well as the absence of 
any linkage (FDI without domestic investment), would be incongruous and conflicting 
with this framework. In fact, if they are no domestic competition and previous inves-
tors on the host country market, foreign firms do not need any specific advantage to 
be competitive; the theory of the multinational company specific advantage falls down.
The modern theory of MNC is implicitly based on the hypothesis of a 
market-knowledge advantage of domestic firms. The foreign firm need to possess a “su-
per power” to overcome the domestic competitors’ advantages due to their proximity 
and their experience of the local market, which allow them to identify and to react to 
new business opportunities faster and sooner5.
Thirdly, McMillan (1998) suggests a close and more explicit link. She supposed that 
private domestic investors have better information about the local business climate than 
do foreign investors. When information is incomplete, domestic investment acts as a 
signal about the situation of the economy to foreign firms. Thus we could expect to 
see domestic investment lead FDI. Ndikumana and Verick (2008) also use this “signal 
theory” to explain the influence of private domestic investments on FDI. Higher level 
of private investment is seen as an indication of high returns to capital; it generates a 
signalling effect to foreign firms that stimulates FDI. 
Last but not least, most of the literature on the determinants of FDI concludes to-
wards the significant and positive role of market size. Hence, to the extent that domestic 
investment determines growth and/or market size, these studies indirectly consider do-
mestic investment as a determinant of FDI. Furthermore, the market size has a positive 
influence on FDI because this variable is a proxy for potential profits. In comparison, 
the level of domestic investment gives more accurate information on profit expecta-
tions in the host country.
4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Since the purpose of this paper is to emphasize the effects of domestic investment on FDI 
inflows in developing countries, the study focuses on that, ignoring several commonly 
analyzed economic variables. However, we include other independent variables often 
used in the literature to explain FDI inflows, with different interpretations for some of 
the variables. The choice of variables was constrained by data availability.
5 The “FDI before domestic investment” sequence is compatible with the Hymer-Dunning framework only 
if we supposed that MNC always posses a more accurate information about the local business climate than 
do domestic firms. The specific advantage is then reduced to a cognitive advantage. The modern theory of 
MNC is changed into a simple information asymmetry explanation, and it disappears once more.
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As is usual in the literature, the dependant variable is the ratio of net FDI flows to 
GDP. Technically, FDI have three components: equity capital, reinvested earnings or 
intracompany loans. FDI inflow may result in the creation of new economic assets in 
the host country (“greenfield” investment) or in the transfer of domestically owned as-
sets to a foreign investor. In the second case, M&A operation implies a transfer of assets 
from domestic to foreign investors and does not increase, at least initially, the country 
capital stock. M&A in DC may often be decided for different reasons than host coun-
try economic attractiveness: privatization policies, fall of assets price due to a debt or 
a liquidity crisis, credit crunch. In such cases, no linkages should be expected between 
FDI and domestic investment. For those reasons, we distinguish the total inflow of FDI 
(FDI/GDP), which includes M&A, and (fresh or “net”) greenfield investments by fo-
reign firms (FDI-M&A/GDP). In the first place, it seems more appropriate to use the 
second variable in our framework.  However, M&A data are less homogeneous, notably 
because it is not possible to trace the origin of the funds used6.
The basic specification for the model is therefore:
FDIit = a0 + a1 stGFCFit + a2FDIst it-1 + a3ICRG it + a’Xit + εit
where i indexes countries, t indexes time, stGFCFit measures the cumulated flows of 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation in the recent past, FDIst it-1 is the lagged FDI stock. ICRG 
it is a synthetic indicator of country risk, Xit is a vector of other variables that are often 
considered as influencing FDI. a0 iis a common fixed effect term and εit is the error term.
stGFCFit is the sum of the actualised value of domestic investment flows during 
the previous five years. We use Gross Fixed Capital Formation, which includes both 
private and public sector investment, because data on private domestic investment in 
DC are too limited. We use a five year period because investment tends to be volatile. 
In a poor DC, a donor grant to finance new infrastructure or new equipment may in-
crease considerably, but briefly, the investment rate. A one year large variation of the 
investment rate may be explained by factors exogenous to the investment climate, as 
a dramatic recession or an unusually large investment. Generally such causes do not 
last. Our indicator is a compromise between the actualised value of the country capital 
stock, which is unavailable, and the investment flow, which is too volatile.  
It is calculated as: 
stGFCFit =  [(GFCF/GDP)it-1 .0.8]+ [(GFCF/GDP)it-2 .0.82]+[(GFCF/GDP)it-3 .0.83]
 + [(GFCF/GDP) it-4 .0.84] + [(GFCF/GDP) it-5 .0.85].
This variable is appropriate with MNC decision process and with an imperfect in-
formation environment : we expect the recent past to influence current FDI flows, be-
cause MNC investment strategies are planned and implemented not annually but on a 
6 For more information on these data, see: <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2009meth_en.pdf>.
REC_16.3_art.750.indd   403 21/01/2013   16:52:57
404 Rev. Econ. Contemp., Rio de Janeiro, v. 16, n. 3, p. 393-414, set-dez/2012
multiannual time period; information on favourable investment opportunities become 
more convincing when they have been confirmed for several years, but their impact 
does not last and information becomes rapidly outdated, which explains the choice of 
a high actualization rate (20%).
FDIst it-1 is calculated as the ratio of the stock of FDI on GDP for the preceding 
year. We expect FDI inflows to have a large correlation with the stock of FDI, whi-
ch captures both the attraction of new FDI to countries with existing investments 
(agglomeration effects increase the profitability of new investments) and reinvested 
profits of MNC returning as FDI inflows to the receiving country (Alaya, 2007; Lim, 
2001; Hanson, 2001).
ICRG it is a synthetic indicator of country risk provided on an annual basis since 
1984. It comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political, financial, and 
economic. This composite index ranges from 0 to 100, the latter corresponding to the 
lowest possible risk. We expect the ICRG index to be positively related to FDI inflows.
As highlighted above, the literature on FDI has focused on other key determinants. 
Our empirical specification therefore includes additional variables. LGDPit is the log 
of the country GDP. LGDPcit is the log of the country GDP per capita in constant 2000 
$. It captures the level of economic development of the country and its productivity, 
as well as the sophistication of the domestic demand, and it should have a positive in-
fluence on FDI. However, GDPc is often used as a proxy for real wages. In the literature, 
the relationship between GDP per capita and FDI is not unanimous. The availability 
of natural resources is often supposed to influence MNC investments. As an opposite 
proxy for this economic specialisation, we used MXit the ratio of manufactured exports 
on total exports. It increases with the country’s level of industrialization and decreases 
when the country specialises on primary products. Its influence on FDI inflows will 
depend on the type of investment. When FDI follow “resource-seeking strategies”, pri-
mary specialisation (i.e., low level of MXit) will have a positive influence on investment 
inflows. GROit-1 is the GDP growth rate of the preceding year. It is expected to have a 
possible positive impact on FDI, mainly through a disincentive effect when growth is 
too weak. TAXit stands for fiscal revenue on GDP (in %), and is a proxy of the global 
tax rate applied to the private sector. INFit is the consumer prices annual change. In a 
preliminary step, we included trade openness (export+import/GDP) and the stock of 
education (from the Barro-Lee database), but these two variables had no significant 
effect (results not reported here).
The model is estimated with panel data. The data set covers 68 developing countries 
over the period 1984-2004. Countries from the former Warsaw Pact are not included 
because of their economic transition and the complete transformation of their FDI 
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policies during the period. The data on FDI are collected from the World Investment 
Report database provided by the United Nations, and most other data used in the mo-
del are taken from the World Bank “World Development Indicators” database. ICRG 
values since 1984 come from the Prsgroup. 
In the results presented below, we control for various usual pitfalls. Hence, outliers 
have been withdrawn and we checked that our data do not present either multicorre-
linearity (variance inflation factors have been calculated) or heteroscedascity (White 
test). However, as expected since we are using time series, the error terms cannot be 
assumed as independent. They are auto-correlated (Durbin-Watson test). Therefore, 
we estimate linear regression model with autoregressive errors (AUTOREG procedure 
from SAS software). The correlation matrix of all the variables used in the equations 
indicates no serious problem, except in one case, where the correlation coefficient of 
LGDP and LGDPc is 0.62.  
Another problem with assessing the effects of domestic investment on FDI inflows 
is endogeneity. For instance, omitted factors could have a positive impact simultaneou-
sly on domestic investment and FDI, because both variables are a signal of economic 
performance. Although, in principle, the endogeneity problem can be avoided by ap-
plying instrumental variable techniques, the fundamental problem is that there are no 
ideal instruments available. To deal with this issue, McMillan (1999) defines domestic 
investment as “net” domestic investment: (GFCF - FDI)it. This methodology drives her 
to a paradox: a negative relationship between domestic investment and FDI. In other 
words, the main linkage is investment substitution: when the domestic firms increase 
their investment on a host market, MNC decide to reduce theirs. However this conclu-
sion results from the ex-ante measure of domestic investment. The link between FDIit 
and (-FDIit) is negative, so is the relationship between FDIit and (-FDIit + GFCFit)! This 
attempt to calculate domestic investment “net” from FDI is inaccurate; it can only lead 
to the conclusion that domestic investment does not stimulate FDI. Furthermore, such 
measure is based on the hypothesis that the whole FDI inflow immediately leads to the 
same amount of capital formation in the host economy. This is wrong. International 
capital transfer and investment implementation are not always simultaneous. Moreover 
foreign capital inflows are sometimes employed to purchase domestic assets. In this 
case, FDI implies ownership change but no additional capital formation: GFCF does 
not increase. These problems explain why we follow Ndikumana and Verick (2008) and 
we use lagged value of investment to build our explanatory variables to minimise the 
bias arising from endogeneity. Our domestic investment proxy does not include FDI 
for the year t and we do not make any inaccurate subtraction or miscalculation that 
would ex-ante influence the result.
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
FDI_GDP 1319 -0.122 0.204 0.019 0.026
FDI-M&A_GDP 1141 -0.280 0.167 0.015 0.027
FDIst-1 1265 -0.370 1.580 0.170 0.188
stGFCF_GDP 1231 0.180 1.240 0.536 0.161
ICRG 1064 25 91 60.410 11.422
MX 1036 0.180 99 40.065 28.312
GDP 1326 177 1 931 710 54 395 142 710.9
GDPc 1325 74.740 24 163.9 2 136.2 3 368.0
GRO-1 1264 -16.830 19.450 3.483 4.201
TAX 484 2 57 15.920 6.325
INF 1285 -11.45 11 749.64 61.941 535.777
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first present the results of OLS regressions for all the countries 
in the sample. Secondly, we split the sample according to three criteria, in order to 
create more homogeneous country groups, and we compare the results for those di-
fferent subsamples.
5.1. RESULTS FOR ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE
The results of the regression for all (developing) countries in the sample are reported 
in Table 3. Specifications (1) to (4) refer to the basic model. From specification (5), we 
progressively exclude non-significant variables. Specifications (7) and (8) refer only to 
the core variables. 
Table 3 reveals several interesting results. First, these regressions show that domestic 
investment has a large positive effect on FDI inflows. The coefficient of stGFCF in these 
specifications is always highly significant; the basic model is robust to changes in specifi-
cations. As anticipated, the coefficient increases for FDI “net” of Mergers and Acquisitions 
(FDI-M&A). Secondly, as expected, FDI inflow is positively correlated with the stock of FDI, 
which confirms the attraction of new FDI to countries with existing MNC investments, and 
country stability, proxied by ICRG, has a very significant positive impact on FDI. The regres-
sion results confirm that political and economic risk is a severe impediment to FDI. A major 
reason is the irreversible nature of FDI due to the large share of sunk cost in FDI projects. 
We include in the first specifications, (1) to (6), the growth, tax and inflation va-
riables, and the signs of coefficients are consistent with predictions, although they are 
statistically insignificant. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on the GDP is ne-
gative and not truly significant. This may reflect the heterogeneity of this sample and 
the fact that FDI may either be attracted by resource-rich countries, usually poor, or 
by market size in less poor developing countries.
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R² 0.348 0.335 0.283 0.280 0.180 0.164 0.154 0.138
Notes: (***) Significant at the 1% level. (**) Significant at the 5% level. (*) Significant at the 10% level. t values 
are in brackets. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
5.2. THE CASE OF RESOURCE-POOR COUNTRIES
Securing the supply of raw materials and other natural resources has been acknowled-
ged as an important objective of MNC, since the earliest works on international invest-
ment in the case of such resource-seeking or rent-seeking FDI, no correlation is to be 
expected with the domestic investment. FDI inflows are driven by specific factors in 
resource-rich countries. Furthermore, the literature on the Dutch-disease and on the 
resource “curse” shows that natural resources abundance rarely stimulates domestic in-
vestment. To exclude this kind of economic structure and such type of FDI incentives 
from our sample, we introduce here an export structure threshold: we classify countries 
where manufactured exports account for less than 25% of total exports (MX<25%) as 
resource-rich economies.
Table 4 reports the regressions on the resulting group of resource-poor de-
veloping countries. The quality of the results increases when the influence of 
natural resources is reduced. As expected, the positive coefficient of domestic 
investment increase when M&A are excluded and the influence is measured on 
the “net” FDI inflow.
REC_16.3_art.750.indd   407 21/01/2013   16:52:57
408 Rev. Econ. Contemp., Rio de Janeiro, v. 16, n. 3, p. 393-414, set-dez/2012
A 1% increase in stGFCF as a percent of GDP is followed by a 0.045% increase 
in future net FDI (FDI-M&A) as a percent of GDP. By construction, stGFCF is 2.7 
times higher than GFCF/GDP (if the investment rate is stable). Thus, the previous 
coefficient means that, on average, a 1% increase of the domestic investment rate in 
the previous five years will increase the current FDI ratio by 0.12 %. This variation 
is significant since the mean of the ratio FDI/GDP in our sample is 1.8 %, and the 
mean of the ratio (FDI-M&A)/GDP is 1.5%.





Constant -0.0484 (-4.86)*** -0.0370 (-3.59)***
FDISt-1 0.0511 (7.11)*** 0.0443 (6.13)***
stGFCF 0.0305 (3.47)*** 0.0448 (4.62)***
ICRG 0.000483 (3.73)*** 0.000249 (1.86)*
MX -0.000033 (-0.53) -0.000088 (-1.37)
LGDPc 0.001665 (1.21) 0.000987 (0.68)
GRO-1 0.000293 (1.54) 0.000233 (1.27)
R² 0.278 0.231
Notes: (***) Significant at the 1% level. (**) Significant at the 5% level. (*) Significant at the 10% level. t values are in brackets. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
5.3. THE CASE OF NON-POOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A second specific feature of developing economies can influence negatively FDI in-
flows. Ceteris paribus, a poverty-trap, or a high level of poverty in a country, will dis-
courage MNC investments. While business and profit opportunities still arise in very 
poor countries, they are less easy to identify by foreign investors, because they may be 
isolated on heterogeneous niche-markets, which are difficult or too costly to penetrate. 
Institutional deficiencies often contribute to reduce further market access for foreig-
ners. Thus we formulate the hypothesis that host country domestic investment may 
stimulate FDI inflow once the country has escaped from poverty, i.e., per capita reach 
$1500 (constant 2000). 
Table 5 shows the regressions for this subsample of “non-poor” developing countries, 
where GDPc is higher than 1500$. stGFCF is still highly significant and its coefficient 
increases when compared to the whole sample. The influence of past domestic invest-
ment trend is strong. On average a 1% increase in GFCF/GDP in the previous five years 
increases current FDI/ GDP by 0.1%, and “net” FDI/GDP by 0.14%.
LGDPc becomes statistically significant and positive. This result further confirms 
the hypothesis that FDI inflow responds positively to host country income level, once 
it grows beyond a threshold level. 
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Constant -0.1078 (-4.50)*** -0.1084 (-4.86)***
FDISt-1 0.0441 (5.09)*** 0.0359 (4.47)***
stGFCF 0.0385 (3.55)*** 0.0528 (4.92)***
ICRG 0.000700 (4.06)*** 0.000508 (2.93)***
MX -0.000093 (-1.29) -0.000090 (-1.33)
LGDPc 0.007120 (2.40)** 0.007064 (2.55)**
GRO-1 0.0000824 (0.36) 0.0000201 (0.09)
R² 0.241 0.252
Notes: (***) Significant at the 1% level. (**) Significant at the 5% level. (*) Significant at the 10% level. t values are in brackets. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
5.4. REGIONAL TRENDS
Next, in tables 6a and 6b we divide the developing world into four main regions: 
(Sub-Saharan) Africa; East Asia; Latin America; Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). The R² increases, indicating the importance of regional effect, except in 
Latin America. Yet domestic investment remains significant only in East Asia. This 
weaker link in other developing regions suggests that other determinants interfere. 
The conclusion that “Africa is different” (Asiedu, 2001) tends to be confirmed by 
our results, which implies that, in Africa, MNC invest more in countries well kno-
wn (FDIst is statistically significant), stable and poor!
Nevertheless, the linkage between domestic and foreign investment in East Asia is im-
pressive. Specifications (14) and (20) show that a large share of the variation in FDI rate can 
be explained by a small number of factors and that stGFCF is statistically very significant 
in East Asia. The strongest effect of domestic investment on FDI is found in East Asia. An 
increase of 1% of the average GFCF/GDP rate raises the “net” FDI/GDP ratio by about 0.2%!
































































R² 0.354 0.521 0.09 0.337
Notes: (***) Significant at the 1% level. (**) Significant at the 5% level. (*) Significant at the 10% level. t values are in brackets. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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Table 6b - Impact of domestic investment on FDI inflow (FDI-M&A)  
by region, 1984-2004
Dependent variable 
FDI-M&A (19) Africa (20) East Asia (21) Latin America (22) MENA
Constant 0.0291 (1.62) -0.1184 (-4.12)*** 0.0135 (0.69) -0.0283 (-1.36)
FDISt-1 0.0649 (6.14)*** 0.0553 (4.15)*** 0.0268 (2.46)** 0.0135 (1.40)
stGFCF -0.0196 (-1.38) 0.0710 (3.36)*** 0.0151 (1.10) 0.0318 (1.93)*
ICRG 0.000777 (3.21)*** 0.000562 (1.28) 0.000529 (2.89)*** 0.000348 (2.21)**
MX -9.321E-6 (-0.08) -0.000422 (-1.96)* 0.0000433 (0.57) 0.0000825 (1.09)
LGDPc -0.0108 (-4.02)*** 0.008371 (1.95)* -0.005725 (-2.04)** -0.001504 (-0.67)
GRO-1 0.000113 (0.36) 0.000420 (0.80) 0.000103 (0.34) -0.000063 (-0.27)
R² 0.264 0.536 0.07 0.173
Notes: (***) Significant at the 1% level. (**) Significant at the 5% level. (*) Significant at the 10% level. t values are in brackets.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the impact of domestic investment on FDI in developing coun-
tries using a large cross-country sample for the period 1984–2004. The literature has 
provided numerous studies on the effects of FDI on growth and investment in host 
country, but the relationship between FDI and domestic investment is bidirectional. 
Yet very little is known about how domestic investment itself affects FDI inflows. The 
understanding of the linkages between domestic investment and FDI is a key to unders-
tand the determinants of countries international attractiveness, which helps in turn to 
select the policy levers that may be activated to increase both FDI inflows and econo-
mic performance in the host country. This paper attempts to contribute to fill this gap.
The empirical results obtained in this paper show, first, a strong influence of previous 
domestic investments on foreign investors. Evidence from annual data for 68 develo-
ping countries suggests that lagged domestic investment has a quantitatively significant 
impact on FDI inflows in the host economy. This impact is strongest when countries 
move away from underdevelopment level. For instance, for DC with a GDP per capita 
above 1500$, a one percent increase in domestic investment, as a percent of GDP, rises 
FDI as a percent of GDP by as much as 0.1%. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient 
increases when total FDI is replaced by greenfield or “net” FDI as the dependant varia-
ble. In the former subsample, the same variation of the domestic investment rate rises 
(FDI-M&A)/GDP by 0.14%. In summary, we can conclude that domestic investment 
is a strong catalyst for FDI in DC; domestic investment appears to be a good predictor 
for future foreign investment inflow.
Second, the empirical results from this study are consistent with endogenous growth 
theories and with the new economic geography (NEG) framework, as they confirm the 
agglomeration of FDI flows in the developing world. However, our results are not com-
pletely in line with the NEG, because here the polarisation forces are centrifuge and not 
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centripetal. The direction of causality goes from the country economic attractiveness, 
appreciated by its rate of investment, to the FDI inflow, and it does not follow a “centre 
to the periphery” route. This finding reveals one of the bases of development strategy, 
before its dissolution in the Washington consensus. The mode of entry of a country 
in the world economy rests upon its internal dynamic, that can be appreciated by its 
rate of investment (Amsden, 2001; Bradford, 1993; Judet, 1986; Rodrik, 2009, 1999).
Third, the policy implications of this study are straightforward. Our results show that 
the promotion of domestic firms investment will lead to more FDI inflows. Developing 
countries will benefit from measures aimed at encouraging domestic investment, and 
a better investment performance will efficiently stimulate FDI. The evidence suggests 
notably that industrial policy, aimed at enhancing the profitability and the scope of 
domestic investments, will be effective to increase FDI inflows in the country as well7.
Many countries are actively trying to attract foreign investors with various incen-
tives and subsidies. The competition between governments to attract FDI tend to shift 
profits and welfare from the host countries to foreign multinationals, while empirical 
research shows that international investment incentives play only a marginal role in de-
termining the international pattern of FDI (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2000; Oman, 2000). 
Thus, a more efficient policy choice would be to transfer the pro-FDI incentives budget 
to industrial policy, or any kind of domestic investment promotion measures, that will 
stimulate domestic firms’ investment. 
Finally, this study confirms that a FDI attraction policy cannot serve as a develop-
ment strategy, because FDI flows are directed towards developing countries which have 
already a strong investment rate! Of course causality between those two variables runs 
in both directions. However, it is important to underline that, ceteris paribus, FDI flows 
where there is already a dynamic process of economic development. Thus, our results 
suggest that MNC follow economic development. 
In other words, the first “developmental convention” (Erber, 2009), which focused 
on changing the productive structure by promoting manufacturing investment, has 
remained quite effective to achieve both structural change and FDI attraction.
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